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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF JUVENILES:
GAULT AND ITS APPLICATION
INTRODUCTION
A bold, new experiment was begun sixty years ago. It was started by
people who believed that juveniles who committed criminal acts needed
treatment rather than punishment. They saw a need for a separate
philosophy of law and an independent system of courts for juveniles.
Here, free from the technical rules of a criminal court, the whole child
could be examined and an individualized treatment plan could be de-
veloped for the wayward youth. The juvenile was not to be labeled
a criminal. It soon became apparent, however, that serious inequities
existed within the juvenile court system. Juveniles were being deprived
of their liberty without basic procedural due process safeguards. In
addition, there was evidence that they were not receiving promised
benefits. The juvenile court system and its philosophy came under at-
tack by educators and jurists as early as the 1920's. However, it was
not until 1966 that the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari to consider the constitutional questions involved in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding. In Application of Gault,' the Supreme Court
proclaimed that juveniles have certain basic procedural due process
rights in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. This decision has plunged
the entire juvenile court system into a state of flux. But before the
Gault decision can be analyzed and its implications understood, it is
necessary first to briefly relate the history of the juvenile court move-
ment.
THE JUVENILE COURT AND ITS PHILOSOPHY
Under the early common law, juvenile and adult offenders were
treated alike. Except for the fact that children under fourteen were pre-
sumed incapable of possessing the necessary criminal intent, juvenile
offenders were subject to the same laws, manner of arrest, trial, and
punishment as adult offenders.' As concern for social reforms de-
veloped, it was inevitable that this aspect of the law would come under
attack.
1. 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967).
2. For those under seven the presumption was conclusive, but between seven and
fourteen the presumption was rebuttable. MACK, THE CHIL, THE CLINIC, AND THE
CouRT 310 (1925).
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As early as 1825, New York City's House of Refuge separated ju-
venile and adult offenders, and attempted to give the children corrective
treatment. In 1847, Massachusetts began the first industrial and reform
school for juveniles. Later, New York and Massachusetts provided for
separate trials, dockets and court records in juvenile cases.3 This was
just a beginning for the early reformers. They wanted more than sep-
aration of juveniles and adults in corrective institutions; they wanted
an independent judicial system that was not fettered by the restrictions
and rigidities of the adult criminal court. The goal was to be rehabilita-
tion of the child, not punishment.4 The child was seen as basically
good and if caught in time he could be saved from his downward
career. The emphasis was to shift from "Has he committed this crime?"
to "What is the best thing to do for this lad?" '
Under this new system, the juvenile no longer had the constitutional
procedural safeguards which he had previously enjoyed. The locution
used to justify this was, "The State is proceeding as 'parens patriae' "6-
a concept presumably borrowed from the Chancery court, where it
meant the power of the State to act "in loco parentis" in protecting the
child, both in regard to his person and his property.7 Another justifica-
tion for the denial was the belief that a child was not entitled to consti-
tutional rights in the first instance. He did not have an absolute right to
freedom, but rather was subject to the restraint of a parent or guardian
to whom he owed obedience.8
As a result of this reform movement, the first distinct statewide court
system for juveniles was established by the Illinois' Juvenile Court Act
in 1889. This court was to hear cases on dependency, neglect and de-
linquency. The hearings were to be informal and closed to the public.
The "sick" child was to be cured. By 1925, all but two states had
established juvenile courts with similar aims.9
The proceedings in these juvenile courts were to be civil not criminal
3. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
TASK FORC REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YouTH CRImE 3 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
4. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 563 (1957).
5. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 107 (1909).
6. Id. 109. See Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923).
7. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases,
1966 Su'. CT. REvImW 167, 173 (1966).
8. Ex parte Sharpe, 15 Idaho 120, 96 P. 563 (1908).
9. TASK FORCE R oRT, supra note 3, at 3.
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in nature.10 The criminal procedural safeguards enumerated in the con-
stitution and its amendments were not required." The child could be
compelled to be a witness against himself' 2 and hearsay was admissi-
ble.' Rights specifically granted to adults by state constitutions and
statutes, such as bail' 4 and trial by jury," were denied. In most courts
there was no right to counsel because it was felt that adversary tactics
and technical objections would hamper the court's task.", It was felt
that the child's interests would be adequately protected by the judge
and the probation officer or the social worker.
This did not mean that the child was subjected to a completely arbi-
trary system of justice. Most courts held that the hearing must meet
a certain standard. It must be fair and impartial; 1" it must contain
fundamental fairness;' s or it must guarantee due process." The problem
10. Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Ex parte Daedler,
194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923); Lindsay
v. Lindsay, 257 11. 328, 100 N.E. 892 (1913); Harris v. Souder, 233 Ind. 287, 119 N.E.2d
8 (1954); Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 151 Mich. 315, 115 N.W. 682 (1908);
Ex parte Newkosky, 94 N.J.L. 314, 116 A. 716 (1920); In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140,
138 P.2d 503 (1943); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932) cert. denied,
289 U.S. 709 (1932); Malone v. State, 130 Ohio St. 443, 200 N.E. 473 (1936); Common-
wealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905); Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38
S.E.2d 444 (1946); State ex. rel. Hinkle v. Skeen, 138 W. Va. 116, 75 S.E.2d 223 (1953),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 967 (1953).
11. See, e.g., People v. Dotson, 46 Cal.2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956).
12. See In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App.2d 205, 183 P.2d 282 (1947); In re Broughton, 192
Mich. 418, 158 N.W. 884 (1916); In re Santilanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943);
People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1932);
In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1954). But
see Ex parte Tahbel, 46 Cal. App. 755, 189 P. 804 (1920); People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y.
307, 155 N.E. 584 (1927).
13. See Cambell v. Siegler, 10 N.J. Misc. 987, 162 A. 154 (1932); In re Holmes, 379 Pa.
599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1954); State ex rel. Christensen v.
Christensen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951).
14. In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App.2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952); Cinque v. Boyd, 99
Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923); Espinosa v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576 (1945).
15. United States ex rel. Yonick v. Briggs, 266 F. 434 (D.C. Pa. 1920); In re Brodie,
33 Cal. App. 751, 166 P. 605 (1917); In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 P. 563 (1908);
Dinson v. Drostra, 39 Ind. App. 432, 80 N.E. 32 (1907); Commonwealth v. Bigwood,
334 Mass. 46, 133 N.E.2d 585 (1956); In re Perham, 104 N.H. 276, 184 A.2d 449 (1962);
In re Lewis, 51 Wash.2d 193, 316 P.2d 907 (1957) (recognizing the rule).
16. People ex rel. Weber v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App.2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (Dist. Ct. App.
1955); Rooks v. Tindall, 138 Ga. 863, 76 S.E. 378 (1912); Akers v. State, 114 Ind. App.
195, 51 N.E.2d 91 (1943); Dudley v. State, 219 S.V.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); In re
Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d 266 (1966).
17. In re Roth, 158 Neb. 789, 64 N.W.2d 799 (1954).
18. United States v. Dickerson, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
19. Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Application of Johnson, 178
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lay in deciding exactly what these standards required. 20 This difficulty
was aggravated by the fact that in most states juvenile proceedings
were not appealable, 21 and inconsistencies could therefore result within
the same jurisdiction. One notable result of the juvenile court system
was that juveniles were often incarcerated for longer periods than adults
would have been for the same offense.22
The early juvenile court system was consequently not without its
critics.2s A survey conducted by the United States Children's Bureau
in 1920 revealed that only sixteen percent of the juvenile courts actually
had separate hearings for juveniles, an authorized probation service, and
the necessary social background on the youths.24 An early case held
that fines imposed by the juvenile court amounted to punishment, and,
therefore, the juvenile was entitled to constitutional protections.2
Similarly, where confinement has amounted to punishment rather than
rehabilitation, education, and care, courts have held that the juvenile
F. Supp. 155 (D. N.J. 1957); People v. Dotson, 46 Cal.2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956); Wissen-
burg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205 (1930); Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398,
118 So. 184 (1928); In re Carlo and Stasilowiez, 48 N.J. 224, 225 A.2d 110 (1966); In re
W., 19 N.Y.2d 55, 224 N.E.2d 102, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1966); Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex.
460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944).
20. Right against self-incrimination see Ex parte Tahbel, 46 Cal. App. 755, 189 P.
804 (1920); Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944). Contra, cases cited
supra note 12.
Exclusion of hearsay, see In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App.2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952);
In re Sippy, 197 A.2d 455 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953); In re Green, 123 Ind. App. 81,
108 N.E.2d 647 (1952); in re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954); People
v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1932) (recog-
nizing the rule); Ballard v. State, 192 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). Contra, cases
cited supra note 13.
21. Wissenberg v. Bradly, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205 (1930). See also State v.
McDonald, 206 La. 732, 20 So.2d 6 (1944); Note, The Juvenile Court-Benevolence in the
Star Chamber, 50 J. CRIMa. L.C. & P.S. 464, 472 (1960).
22. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905) (juvenile received three years
for larceny when maximum sentence for an adult would have been six months); In re
Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1954) (juvenile
confined until his majority, 4 years, for driving without a license); State v. Cagle, 111
S.C. 548, 96 S.E. 291 (1918) (Two boys, eight and ten, were confined until their majority
for petit larceny for which an adult would receive thirty days).
23. Waite, How For Can Court Procedures Be Socialized Without Impairing In-
dividual Rights, 13 J. AM. INsT. OF CraM. L. & CRiM. 339 (1922).
24. TAPPAN, JUEN-ILE DELINQUENcY 173 (1949). In 1966, the Children's Bureau con-
ducted a similar survey which revealed that the gap still exists between the ideal and
the practice in juvenile courts. TAsk FoRcE REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
25. Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 151 Mich. 315, 115 N.W. 682 (1908).
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may challenge the validity of his custody.26 The most famous diatribe
on the juvenile court system was delivered by Justice Musmanno in
his dissenting opinion in In re Holmes where he stated:
[F]airness and justice certainly recognize that a child has the
right not to be a ward of the State, not to be committed to a re-
formatory, not to be deprived of his liberty, if he is innocent. The
procedure for ascertaining the guilt or innocence of a minor may
be ... [called] a civil inquiry . . .but in substance and in form
it is a trial.... And no matter how trained and experienced a Ju-
venile Court judge may be, he cannot by any magical fishing rod
draw forth the truth out of a confused sea of speculation, rumor,
suspicion and hearsay. He must follow certain procedures which
the wisdom of the centuries have established.27
The view of the juvenile proceeding as a civil rather than a
criminal proceeding has been consistently criticized. 28 One expert stated
that labelling juvenile proceedings "non-criminal" was "a convenient but
highly misleading sophistry." 29 Where a California statute said that
adjudication of a minor as a ward of the court "shall not be deemed con-
viction of a crime," the court held that "for all practical purposes, this
is a legal fiction, presenting a challenge to credulity and doing violence
to reason." -o An adjudication of delinquency will affect a juvenile's
later chances for employment, education and even a military career.3 '
As Justice Musmanno said, "To say that a graduate of a reform school
is not to be 'deemed a criminal' is very praiseworthy but this placid
26. "Unless the institution is one whose primary concern is the individual's moral
and physical well-being, unless its facilities are intended for and adapted to
guidance, care, education and training rather than punishment ... it seems
clear a commitment to such an institution is by reason of conviction of a
crime and cannot withstand an assault for violation of fundamental constitu-
tional safeguards."
White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647, 650 (D.D.C. 1954).
See Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Kautter v. Reid, 183 F. Supp. 352
(D.D.C. 1960). See also Elmore v. Stone, 355 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (separate
opinion of Bazelon, C. J.); cf. In re Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d 266 (1966).
27. 379 Pa. at 613, 109 A.2d at 529.
28. Cases cited supra note 14.
29. Tappan, Unofficial Delinquency, 29 NEB. L. REv. 547, 548 (1950).
30. In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App.2d 787, 789, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1932).
31. Sheridan, Double Jeopardy and Waiver in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 23
FED. PROBATION 43 (1959).
[Vol. 9:492
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bromide commands no authority in the fiercely competitive fields of
everyday modern life." 32
APPLICATION OF GAULT
With all of this ferment, states began to re-examine their juvenile
court statutes.3 3 Cases involving involuntary confessions made by ju-
veniles and admitted into evidence against them in juvenile court, were
dismissed. 4 Courts began to point out that before juvenile court acts, a
child was entitled to all the constitutional protections3 5 and that the
"legislative intent was to enlarge, not diminish, these protections." 36
It was in this atmosphere that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider Kent v. United States,37 a District of Columbia delinquency
proceeding involving a juvenile's rights in a waiver hearing to give
jurisdiction to the criminal court. While the Court's decision to grant
these rights turned on the interpretation of the District of Columbia's
statute, it forecast the Court's growing dissatisfaction with the juvenile
system when it said: "There is evidence ... that there may be grounds
for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children." as Approximately
one year later, the same Court decided a case which changed the entire
complexion of juvenile rights. In Application of Gault,39 the Supreme
Court squarely faced, for the first time, the issue of whether juveniles
were entitled to basic procedural due process in a delinquency proceed-
ing. Gerald Gault, fifteen years old, claimed that his due process rights
had been violated at the proceeding at which he was declared a delin-
quent. This finding was based on an alleged telephone call which he
32. In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 611, 109 A.2d 523, 528 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
973 (1954).
33. California and New York provided for the right to have counsel appointed and
the right to be informed of this fact. See CAL. WFLF. & INsT. CODE §§ 633, 634, 659, 700
(West 1966); N.Y. FAMmY CouRt Acr §§ 241, 249, 728, 741 (McKinney 1962).
34. In re Carlo and Stasilowiez, 48 N.J. 224, 225 A. 2d 110 (1966).
35. Commonwealth v. Horregan, 127 Mass. 450 (1879) (right to presentment by
grand jury); State ex rel Cunningham v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406 (1884) (due process; trial
by jury); People ex rel O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280 (1870) (due process of law).
36. In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 225 (D.D.C. 1955).
37. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). The statute said the juvenile could be waived to criminal
court after "full investigation." The Court held that the juvenile in such a case is
entitled to a hearing, to access by his counsel to social records which were considered
by the court and a statement of the reasons for the decision.
38. Id. at 556.
39. 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967).
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made using lewd or indecent remarks, and on his past behavior.40
While his parents were at work and without any notice to them, Gerald
was taken to the Detention Home. A preliminary hearing was held the
next day, but Gerald was not released until three or four days after
the hearing. At this time his parents were notified there would be further
hearings on his "delinquency." Neither Gerald nor his parents were ad-
vised of their right to counsel. The complainant did not appear at either
of the hearings. The evidence at the two hearings consisted of the pro-
bation officer's testimony as to what the complainant told him over the
telephone, and Gerald's own statements which were elicited without
warning him of his privilege against self-incrimination. Violation of due
process was claimed because the Arizona Supreme Court held there
was no right to appellate review of a juvenile court order and therefore
no need of a transcript.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Arizona Court,
proclaiming that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone." 4' This does not connote that all criminal
safeguards are going to automatically be transplanted to the juvenile
court. As the Court said in Kent: "We do not mean.., to indicate that
the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a
criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing, but we do
hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process
and fair treatment." 42 The Court held that in Gault, due process re-
quired notice of charges,43 right to appointment of counsel, including
the right to be notified of same, the right to confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court did not rule on the questions of the right to appeal and to re-
ceive a copy of the transcript.4
40. Two years prior to the telephone call incident, Gerald had been referred to
the court because his companion allegedly stole a baseball glove. No hearing was ever
held. Id. at 1434.
41. Id. at 1436.
42. 383 U.S. at 562.
43. The notice must meet the standards of notice in a civil or criminal case. In a
criminal context see, e.g., Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). In a civil context
see, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
44. While it pointed out that the federal constitution has not been construed as
requiring states to provide such review [Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 1218 (1956)], it also
discussed the unfortunate consequences of such failure in juvenile cases (87 S. Ct. at
1460). This would appear to imply when the issue is clearly presented to the Court,
they will consider it a discriminatory denial of right of appeal and therefore a violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment [See generally State v.
Janiec, 6 N.J. 608, 80 A.2d 94 (1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 955 (1951)].
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EFFECTS OF THE GAULT DECISION
The Gault decision does not abrogate the juvenile court system. The
Court strictly confined the applicability of Gault "to proceedings by
which a determination is made as to whether a juvenile is 'delinquent'
as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that
he may be committed to a state institution." 45 Even in these proceed-
ings, the benefits of the system are to be retained .4
The difficulty remains of ascertaining what due process in a juvenile
proceeding requires. The problem is complicated by the fact that there
is no exact definition of due process. Its meaning varies with the circum-
stances, subject matter, and necessities of the situation. The late Chief
Justice Vanderbilt said, regarding due process for juveniles, that "[t] he
indispensable elements of due process are: first, a tribunal with jurisdic-
tion; second, notice of a hearing to the proper parties; and finally, a
fair hearing." 48 There should be a difference between due process in
the criminal court system and due process in a juvenile court. The exi-
gency is not for all the technical rules of criminal courts, but it is
for those which produce a correct and impartial determination of the
facts. The rights granted in Gault all point in this direction. In addition,
these rights will make the system seem less arbitrary to the child.49
45. 87 S. Ct. at 1436.
46. ". . . As we shall discuss, the observance of due process standards, intelli-
gently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to
abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process."
Id. 1440.
"... . But the features of the juvenile system which its proponents have
asserted are of unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domes-
tication." Id 1441.
"... While due process requirements will, in some instances, introduce
a degree of order and regularity to juvenile court proceedings to determine
delinquency, and in contested cases will introduce some element of the ad-
versary system, nothing will require that the conception of the kindly
juvenile judge will be replaced by its opposite . . ." Id. 1443.
"... In any event, there is no reason why, consistently with due process,
a State cannot continue if it deems appropriate, to provide and to improve
provisions for confidentiality of records of police contacts and court action
relating to juveniles . . ." id. 1442.
47. E.g., Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
48. Vanderbilt, Foreword to VIRTUE, BASIC SraucrURE OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES IN
MICmAN at x (1953).
49. ". . . [Tlhere is increasing evidence that the informal procedures, contrary
to the original expectation, may themselves constitute a further obstacle to
the effective treatment of the delinquent to the extent that they engender
1967]
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Other constitutional rights, both state and federal, need to be scru-
tinized with the following questions in mind. What do they have to
offer to the juvenile court system? Will they merely make it more
formal or will they serve a real need? At least one author has urged that
"children accused of acts that would be crimes if committed by adults
are entitled as of constitutional right in the juvenile courts to all con-
stitutional safeguards recognized in that jurisdiction to those charged
with crimes in the usual criminal courts." 0 This is too far-reaching.
What is needed is a selective due process adapted to the peculiar needs
of a juvenile court. The reasoning in Gault can be analyzed and ex-
panded in order to determine what additional riohts, if any, will fall
into this category.
Rights at Adjudication
Most juveniles are denied the right to trial by jury in juvenile court."'
Trial by jury is not made mandatory on the states by the fourteenth
amendment,Z2 but all states have a provision providing for it in their
constitutions in criminal cases. Conceivably, the Court could hold that
the states have to administer this provision consistently with equal pro-
tection, and, therefore, apply it to juveniles as well as adults. There is,
however, nothing in Gault which would indicate this change of posi-
tion.- The addition of a jury would of necessity add many of the
formalities of a criminal trial without providing compensating advan-
tages. With the implementation of the rights enunciated in Gault, the
fact-finding role of the jury can be adequately performed by the
judge.55
Like trial by jury, the requirement of a public trial is not necessary
in the child a sense of injustice provoked by seemingly all-powerful and
challengeless exercise of authority by judges and probation officers."
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOcIETY 85 (1967) (hereinafter cited as CRIME COM-
MISSION REPoRT).
50. Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L. Q. 387, 392 (1961).
51. CRIME COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 49, at 38.
52. Hughes v. Heinze, 268 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1959).
53. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 36 U.S.L.W. 2187 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 1967).
The court held that nothing in Gault entitles the juvenile to jury trial since jury trial
is not an essential element of due process. Its absence does not hinder the search for
the truth.
54. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINr. L. REv. 547, 559 (1957).
55. As to the importance of trial by jury see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937).
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to assure the child of due process. Secret hearings are always suspect
and it is thought that by opening the trial to the public, including the
press, the accused will be better guaranteed a fair trial. Before Gault
this might have been a powerful argument because usually the only
persons present were the judge, the arresting officer, the probation
officer, the juvenile and his parents. This, coupled with the fact there
was no right to appellate review, gave the impression of a Star Chamber
proceeding.-0 Now, the child's interests can be adequately protected
by the presence of his attorney without exposing him to the glare of
publicity. In addition, making the trial public would controvert one
of the major aims of the juvenile system which is the protection of
the youth from the stigma of being labelled a criminal by keeping the
matter confidential. The addition of the public might also provide an
audience for an unregenerate adolescent0 7 or prevent the establishment
of communications between the court and the child.58
Another right that was not before the Court in Gault is the right
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses.
Although it is acknowledged in some juvenile courts, 9 it was suggested
in at least two instances that the right did not exist.10 For all practical
purposes this right must be regarded as having been granted in Gault.
This is an essential feature of the fact-finding process and its absence
would severely impair counsel's ability to present an adequate defense.
The issues of the standard of proof required and the type of evidence
admissible in a juvenile court are often raised. Some courts hold that
the charge must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt0' while others
hold that a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient. 2 In some courts
hearsay is admissible, while in others it is error. 3 Although these issues
56. "The powers of the Star Chamber were trifle in comparison with those of ourjuvenile courts... ." Pound, Foreword to YOUNG, SociAL TREATmTr IN PROBATION AND
DELINQUENCY at XXVii (1937).
57. Symposium, The Public's Right to Know, 5 N.P.P.A.J. 431, 432 (1959).
58. Subcomm. on Youth and Family in the Courts to the N.Y. Temporary Comm.
on the Courts, A PROPOSAL FOR DALING wfrn Yourr IN rHE COURTS 47-48 (1954).
59. W. Gelhorn, CHILDREN AND FAMILEs IN TIM COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY 78 (1954).
60. Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923) (dictum); White v. Reid, 125
F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954) (dictum).
61. In re Lewis, 11 N.J. 217, 94 A.2d 328 (1953); Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va.
335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
62. United States v. Borders, 154 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala. 1957); People v. Lewis,
260 N.Y. 171, 183 NE. 353 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1932); Robinson v. State,
204 S.W.2d 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court, 139 Wash.
1, 245 P. 409 (1926).
63. See Campbell v. Siegler 10 NJ. Misc. 987, 162 A. 154 (1932); In re Holmes, 379
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were not present in Gault, the Court indicated its feeling when it cited
with approval from a pamphlet by the Children's Bureau which recom-
mended that "testimony should be under oath and that only competent
material and relevant evidence under rules applicable to civil cases
should be admitted in evidence." 14
As the law presently exists, juveniles are not protected by the ex-
clusionary rule of Weeks v. United States65 and Mapp v. Ohio6 from
the use of evidence seized in an illegal search.67 This doctrine was
repudiated in In the Matter of Two Brothers and a Case of Liquor. s
Here two juveniles were accused of larceny of ninety cases of liquor.
They moved to suppress the introduction of a case of liquor as evidence
on the grounds that it was a product of an illegal search and seizure in
violation of their fourth amendment rights.69 The court held that while
the police had probable cause to take the youths into custody, the search
violated the fourth amendment. The crux of the problem was whether
the juvenile court was a "court" within the meaning of Weeks and
Mapp. The court answered this question by holding that:
[w]hether the Juvenile Court is called a criminal court, a civil
court, or a special tribunal, the policy behind the exclusionary
rule applies. The only way to implement the mandate of the
Fourth Amendment is to deny the fruits of illegal searches and
seizures to the government by suppressing such evidence. The
Juvenile Court had the same responsibility as any other court to
refuse to become an accessory after the fact to illegal police
activity which violates constitutional rights.70
The applicability of the rule does not rest on the label given to the
court. In Powell v. Zuckert,71 the exclusionary rule was invoked even
Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1954); State ex. rel. Christensen
v. Christensen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951).
64. STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS, Children's Bureau Pub. No. 437
at 72-73 (1966) (hereinafter cited as STANDARDS).
65. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
66. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
67. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 145 Colo. 53, 358 P.2d 1028, rev'd on other grounds,
370 U.S. 49 (1962).
68. Nos. 66-2652-J, 66-2653-J (Juv. Ct. D.C. Dec. 28, 1966). Reprinted in 17 Juv.
CT. JUDGES J. 153 (Winter 1967) (hereinafter cited as "Brothers").
69. One brother was arrested outside of their apartment. The police vent upstairs to
the apartment (5:30 A.M.) to arrest the other. They entered the apartment, arrested
the boy, who was asleep in the bedroom, and seized a case of liquor which was either
in the living room or kitchen doorway.
70. "Brothers", 17 JUV. CT. JUDGES J. 153 at 154-55.
71. 366 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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though it was a civil proceeding. Again, the Court in Gault did not
deal with this issue but by applying its reasoning, it seems certain that
this right will be extended to juveniles.
In Gault the confessions and admissions used were elicited from
Gerald during the hearings without warning him of the privilege against
self-incrimination. The Court did not reach the issue of Escobedo v.
llinois7W 2 and Miranda v. Arizona73 because neither the circumstances of
the questioning by the probation officer after Gerald had been taken
into custody nor the statements he made appeared in the record. A
recent California case, however, held that the Miranda procedural guar-
antees do not apply in California juvenile courts. The reasons the
court gave were that the proceeding was civil, and the court was
merely giving him the help and guidance that his parents should have
given him. 74
The Supreme Court did make reference to Miranda when it said:
"In light of Miranda v. State of Arizona, . . . we must also consider
whether if the privilege against self-incrimination is available, it can be
effectively waived unless counsel is present or the right to counsel is
waived." 75 Considering this, plus the reservations the Court has expressed
concerning the acquisition and use -of a juvenile's confession, 0 it seems
evident that when the issue is presented to the Court, it will apply
Miranda in its entirety. Presumably it will be treated as self-incrimina-
tion was in Gault, with the Court recognizing special problems and
conceding that there could be differences in technique but not in prin-
ciple in applying the rule.77
72. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
73. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
74. In re Castro, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469, 473 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). See also Note, Miranda
Guarantees in California Juvenile Court, 7 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 114 (1966).
75. Application of Gault, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967).
76. ". . . This Court has emphasized that admissions and confessions of
juveniles require special caution." Id. at 1453.
"... And where, as here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is
before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used . . . We
cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for police in such a
contest. He needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim
first of fear, then of panic .... No lawyer stood guard to make sure that
the police went so far and no farther, to see to it that they stopped short of
the point where he became the victim of coercion. No counsel or friend
was called during the critical hours of questioning." Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596, 599 600 (1948).
77. 87 S. Ct. at 1458.
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Rights Applicable to the Pre-Judicial Stages
While the Court was not concerned with the pre-judicial stages of
the juvenile process, its decision will have a decided impact on this
area. This stage is vitally important in the juvenile court system. In
1957, fifty-one percent of all delinquency cases referred to juvenile
courts were disposed of pre-judicially.78 Some are adjusted at the police
level, while others are settled at the juvenile court intake process. This
system was borrowed directly from social agencies.7 1 It is both a screen-
ing process, ascertaining the sufficiency of the petition, and a helping
process. The petition may be dismissed or filed; the case may be referred
to another agency; or informal supervision by the probation officer
may be required or even actual detention imposed. Normally neither a
defense counsel nor a prosecuting attorney appear.80
The very nature of the situation lends itself to abuse. The screening
agency with the power to refer the juvenile to court has a powerful
lever to force acceptance of its terms. This is not to imply that the
power is completely misused. Screening serves valid needs. It eliminates
those cases over which the juvenile court has no jurisdiction, thereby
reducing a badly overcrowded court calendar. It can also handle cases
which are relatively minor and spare the child the label of delinquent
or possibly a quasi-criminal record.8
The instances where this system comes under the sharpest attack are
those where it seeks to control the child through probation or detention.
This amounts to punishment without an adjudication of guilt. This is
a clear denial of due process, and would appear to be an area which
the courts could correct. Other problems at the intake level, such as
establishing a uniform criteria for referral, would be better handled on
an administrative level.
A recent study showed that "in 1965, two-thirds of all juveniles
apprehended were admitted to detention facilities and held there an
average of twelve days. . ..", 82 A California report showed that during
1958, almost 8,400 juveniles were held for relatively minor offenses such
as truancy, traffic violations, disturbing the peace, and minor liquor law
78. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTr CaIME 14 (1967) (hereinafter
cited as TASK FORCE REPORT).
79. See generally Sheridan, Juvenile Court Intake, 2 J. FAM. L. 139 (1962).
80. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 78, at 15.
81. See, id., at 9-22.
82. CRIME CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 49, at 37.
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violations sa3 In spite of this, most authorities agree that juveniles should
not be admitted to bail as a matter of right.Y4 Bail has been denied as a
matter of right because the proceeding was civil in nature and the
statute required bail only in criminal cases."5 The label of the proceeding
can no longer serve as justification for a denial of rights. While there
is evidence to show that sometimes juveniles are detained merely for
the shock effect on the juvenile, 6 in other cases, it is for the protection
of the juvenile. Sometimes there may not be a responsible person to
whom the juvenile can be released. For this reason, bail should be left
to the discretion of the judge and not be a matter of right for the
juvenile. Many of the problems raised by detention could be solved
by providing for better physical facilities, and detention hearings as soon
as possible after the youth's apprehension.
Rights Applicable at the Disposition Stage
Two important issues at the disposition stage are the use of social re-
ports in sentencing and the right to counsel. A distinction must be made
between the use of the report at the hearing to determine delinquency
and its use at the disposition stage. It is clearly out of place at the hear-
ing. It contains hearsay and other evidence which should not be admitted
by the court, and it denies the juvenile the right to confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses. At the dispositional hearing, such social
and psychiatric data becomes highly relevant in determining the sentence
to be imposed.
The attorney can serve a valuable function at this hearing. The Na-
tional Crime Commission strongly advocates appointment of counsel
at the dispositional hearing when it states: "It is the disposition stage at
which the opportunity arises to offer individualized treatment plans and
in which the danger inheres that the court's coercive power will be
applied without adequate knowledge of the circumstances." 87 An at-
torney could acquaint the court with special facts and offer his own
disposition plan as an alternative to that of the social worker. This
problem will probably be solved by the appointment of an attorney
at the delinquency proceeding.
83. Id. at 36.
84. Paulsen, Fairness to the juvenile Offender, 41 Miux. L. REv. 547, 552 (1957).
85. Espinosa v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576 (1965). But see Trimble v.
Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960); State v. Franklin, 202 La. 439, 12 So.2d 211 (1943).
86. TAsK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 78, at 13.
87. CmmE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 51, at 87.
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Other Problems
Another issue on which the courts will have to take a position in-
volves the statutes which bring the juvenile within the jurisdiction of
the court. Many of them are rather vague, subjecting the child to
juvenile court jurisdiction if he is habitually involved in immoral affairs
or in danger of leading an immoral life. This is particularly true of
statutes which make conduct, which is legal for adults, illegal for
children. This includes violating curfew laws, truancy, incorrigibility,
drinking, and associating with felons or gamblers., Some of these
statutes may be so broad that they are unconstitutionally vague. 9
They may not tell the juvenile what type of behavior he must avoid.
Officials may be given almost unlimited power to determine what kind
of behavior will subject the youth to their jurisdiction. In spite of
this danger, there is a real need for the juvenile court to have a broad
and general jurisdiction.90 The purpose of the juvenile court is still to
recognize those children who have broken the law or are in danger
of becoming criminals and to help them. Gault added that this must
be done consistent with due process of law."
Still another problem relates to the arrest of the juvenile. Some
statutes allow a juvenile to be arrested without a warrant for a mis-
demeanor not committed in the officer's presence. 2 Under the common
law, a peace officer could arrest without a warrant a person who com-
mitted a misdemeanor in his presence, if it amounted to a breach of
the peace. The reason for the arrest was preservation of the public
peace, not apprehension of the offender." Such arrests cannot be justi-
fied by asserting that law enforcement would be more difficult and un-
certain without them. 5
88. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 78, at 25.
89. See generally Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1945); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451 (1939).
90. Standards, supra note 64, at 43-45. See also GOLDBERG & SHERI)AN, FAMILY COCRTS:
AN URGENT NEED (Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't HEW 1960).
91. If the legislators had to draw statutes defining illegal juvenile behavior as nar-
rowly as they do criminal statutes, there would be many situations in which the law
would not have an effective way of dealing with this behavior. The decision in each
case will depend on the wording of the particular statute. If it gives the juvenile
court practically unlimited powers to determine what actions shall be illegal, it should
be struck down. If it gives the court discretion within a limited framework, it should
be approved.
92. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Star. § 8-221 (West 1956).
93. State v. Lutz, 85 W.Va 330, 101 S.E. 434 (1919).
94. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
95. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
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The argument advanced for allowing juveniles to be arrested without
warrants is based on the assumption that if there is a question or
suspicion about the juvenile's behavior, it is better to bring him under
the authority of the police or juvenile court and see that he receives
proper guidance. This concern for the child's welfare should not over-
shadow the fact that the child has the right to remain free until he has
violated the law or the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that he
has. It is no more trouble for the officer to get a warrant in the case of
a child than it is in the case of an adult. If the evidence will not support
the issuance of a warrant, then the child must remain free. The
philosophy of Gault makes it clear that the child has the right not to
be the object of the state's care and solicitude. While requiring war-
rants in these instances may mean that some youths who need help
will not receive it, it will introduce a system of orderliness in arrest
practices so that the child will not feel that his arrest is the result of an
arbitrary whim of the police officer.
Other Proceedings in Juvenile Court
A juvenile court is concerned with three types of proceedings-
delinquency, neglect, and dependency. While the Gault decision ap-
plied only to delinquency proceedings, its reasoning applies equally to
those other proceedings. Neglect and dependency encompass the situa-
tion where the child is destitute or lacks proper parental care. Some
jurisdictions distinguish the two, making neglect applicable where the
condition is due to the faults of the parents and dependency where the
parents, if any, are without fault. " This is the most appropriate area
for the state to exercise its concern with the welfare of juveniles. 9
Yet even here the due process elements as expressed in Gault must be
required. The child's interests may require that he be removed from
his parents, but this is a very serious decision contravening the basic
custodial rights of parenthood and should be taken only in accordance
with basic due process requirements.
96. In re Duncan, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 173, 107 N.E.2d 256 (Ct. App. 1951); In re
Graham, 110 Utah 159, 170 P.2d 172 (1946). The Children's Bureau excludes dependent
children from juvenile court jurisdiction because "[n]o child should be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court for economic reasons alone. . . . Such assistance should be
provided by a social agency." STANDARDS, supra note 64, at 34.
97. In 1965, there were 157,000 dependency and neglect cases in the United States.
CGHIIREN's BuRFAu, JuvENiLE COURT STATISncS 6 (U.S. Dep'r HEW, Stat. Set. No. 85,
1965).
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CONCLUSION
The juvenile court system was established and begun in a time of
awakening social conscience. The basic philosophy of the movement
was that children who violated laws were not criminals and should not
be treated as such. If the child could be recognized early in his way-
ward career, his later criminal development could be arrested. The
juvenile court by taking into account his past behavior, environmental
factors and various specialized reports, could arrive at an individualized
treatment plan. The child was not to be punished for his illegal act
as he would be in a criminal court. Instead, his action would serve as
a basis, along with other factors, in determining if he was in need of
help.
This noble plan developed two major faults. It could not develop
sufficient personnel and facilities to enable it to meet its high ideals,
and children were denied constitutional elements of due process merely
because they were children and the proceedings were labelled "civil."
Gault stands for the proposition that juveniles in a delinquency pro-
ceeding have certain rights to procedural due process. Children, like
adults, are entitled to certain procedural safeguards which the state
must satisfy before it can interfere with his life. Merely because he is
a child or it is for his own good, are no longer sufficient reasons to
deny these rights. Courts should brush aside the labels and look at the
reality of the situation. If the child is threatened with punishment or
loss or impairment of liberty, these due process elements apply.
This decision does not obliterate the juvenile court system. It does
not advocate wholesale transfer of all rights guaranteed in an adult
criminal trial. It is grounded in the concept of selective due process,
not application of specific constitutional amendments. Its call is for an
integration of the best features of the juvenile court (separate treatment,
confidentiality of records and the non-criminal label) with certain basic
constitutional procedural protections. This will give the system an
orderliness and consistency which previously it has lacked. Finally,
Gault shows the juvenile that he has an interest in the law. It is there
to protect him as well as to restrict him.
Karen L. Atkinson
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